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Prototypical Reasoning about Species and the Species Problem
Yuichi Amitani
Abstract The species problem is often described as
the abundance of conflicting definitions of species, such
as the biological species concept and phylogenetic species
concepts. But biologists understand the notion of species
in a non-definitional as well as a definitional way. In
this article I argue that when they understand species
without a definition in their mind, their understand-
ing is often mediated by the notion of good species, or
prototypical species, as the idea of “prototype” is ex-
plicated in cognitive psychology. This distinction helps
us make sense of several puzzling phenomena regarding
biologists’ dealing with species, such as the fact that
in everyday research biologists often behave as if the
species problem is solved, while they should be fully
aware that it is not. I also briefly discuss implications
of this finding, including that some extant attempts to
answer what the nature of species is have an inade-
quate assumption about how the notion of species is
represented in biologists’ minds.
Keywords Definition · Good species · Prototype
theory · Species problem
1 Introduction
A book on the history of the so-called “species prob-
lem” would probably begin with the advent of the new
Note: This is the penultimate version of the pub-
lished paper (Amitani, Y., 2015, Prototypical Rea-
soning about Species and the Species Problem, Biolog-
ical Theory). But since in the published version many
paragraphs are unintentionally divided to a miscom-
munication in the editing process, you may find this
version more readable.
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systematics and the biological species concept (BSC),
and continue with the many other definitions that fol-
lowed in its wake. Wilkins (2009a) cites more than 20
definitions of species in his book on the history of the
concept of species.
But this perspective on the history of the species
problem would only illuminate one aspect of it, because
biologists often deploy the notion of species without ad-
vocating a particular species definition. This fact about
biologists’ use of species was observed by naturalists as
early as Charles Darwin (1859, p. 44).
No one definition [of ‘species’] has as yet sat-
isfied all naturalists; yet every naturalist knows
vaguely what he means when he speaks of a species.
(italics added)
Darwin’s remark suggests there are two different
modes of understanding the concept of species:
1. Biologists may understand species through defini-
tions.1
2. Biologists may understand species through non-definitional
means (Darwin calls this a “vague” way of under-
standing).
Biologists have done both.
This article aims to show that Darwin was by and
large right regarding biologists’ thinking about species.
This will involve turning to the psychological litera-
ture concerning prototype thinking, and how this sheds
new light on the species problem. In particular, I sug-
gest that the concept of good species, a prototype of
species, mediates the non-definitional, or perhaps im-
plicit mode of understanding of species. A good species
is a taxon judged to be a species according to more than
one species criterion ——such as reproductive isolation
1 Names of concepts are written in italics.
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and phylogenetic properties—— or a taxon judged gen-
erally to be a species by competent biologists, whether
the phrase merely expresses one’s epistemic confidence
in the taxonomic judgment or has even an ontologi-
cal implication that the species category is divided into
good and not-so-good species. I will explain how these
uses of ”good species” involve reasoning about species
in non-definitional ways.
This is not just describing one aspect of biologists’
reasoning about species. Instead, it helps illuminate
why biologists cannot reach a resolution of the species
problem and what we should do to do so. For one, I en-
list this idea to argue that many extant accounts of the
species problem pay excessive attention to the incom-
patibility of individual species definitions, and overlook
the notion of good species. Several authors, for example,
have proposed radical solutions to the species problem
——such as that “species” does not constitute a sin-
gle coherent concept—— based on the assumption that
individual definitions of species are incompatible. How-
ever, biologists recognize that good species and the gen-
eral concept of species play significant epistemological
roles in their research.
The structure of this paper is as follows. In the
next section, I briefly review a psychological concept of
prototype as explicated in cognitive psychology. In the
third section, I characterize the notion of good species
in more detail. I suggest that good species is a prototype
of the concept species and that biologists occasionally
represent the concept of species by good species. This
is an example of what Kahneman and Frederick (2002)
call attribute substitution. In the fourth section, we will
see how attribute substitution can make sense of the
way in which biologists work with the concept of species
and the species problem. Finally, I briefly discuss how
this finding presents problems with several extant at-
tempts to describe and solve the species problem.
2 Prototype as a Psychological Concept
Here I give a brief review of prototype theory of concept
and the concept of prototype as explicated in cognitive
psychology. For a detailed overview of the psychologi-
cal literature, see for example, Laurence and Margolis
(1999) and Murphy (2002). I will also enlist several fea-
tures of a prototype when I argue that good species is
a prototype of species (§3.2).
Cognitive psychologists began to pay serious atten-
tion to prototypes when they discovered prototype ef-
fects (Rosch and Mervis, 1975; Rosch, 1978). Prototype
effects have been seen as a critical blow to the tradi-
tional theory of concepts, aptly dubbed the classical
theory. According to the classical theory, a concept is
represented by necessary and sufficient conditions for
its application: a bachelor is an unmarried man. One
implication of this theory is that every instance of a
concept is treated the same way in our mind as long as
it satisfies those conditions: if Tom and George are both
bachelors, then our mind represents them in the same
way in this regard. Prototype effects provide strong ev-
idence against this picture. “Clear” or prototypical in-
stances of a concept and “unclear” or atypical ones may
be represented differently in our mind. When subjects
undertake various tasks involving concepts (e.g., nam-
ing instances of a concept or judging the membership of
a particular instance of a concept), their responses of-
ten differ depending on whether or not they are dealing
with prototypes of a category. There are a number of
examples of this: subjects require less time to identify a
typical member of a category (e.g., a dog for pet), than
an atypical member (e.g., a snake); young children learn
category membership of typical members first (i.e., they
tend to learn that apple is a fruit before learning that
so is olive); when subjects are asked to list members
of a category, they tend to name typical members first,
and more frequently.
From these results, researchers like Eleanor Rosch
put forward the prototype theory of a concept: a con-
cept is associated with a cluster of features and each
feature is weighted by the frequency with which it is
exemplified by the members of the category. For ex-
ample, fruit is associated with features such as being
sweet and brightly colored, and those features are ex-
emplified with different frequencies by different kinds
of fruits. A prototype is a highly exemplary instance of
a concept by virtue of possessing a sufficient number of
those features, as apples are prototypical fruits because
they have so many of those properties. This explains the
graded membership of instances of a concept, because
different members of the category fruit have a different
number of those features. The prototype theory also
explains how subjects react to different kinds of fruit
differently. It takes less time to categorize apples as a
fruit than olives because subjects can quickly and con-
fidently recognize that apples are more similar to other
members of fruits than those of vegetables, since apples
have many important features of fruit. Although there
are several objections to the prototype theory (see Lau-
rence and Margolis, 1999, for the objections), it is one
of the leading accounts on concepts in cognitive psy-
chology.2
2 See Footnote 10 on whether the objections affect the ar-
guments in the present article.
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3 Notion of ‘Good Species’
In this section I apply the psychological notion of proto-
type to the concept of ”good species.” ”Good species”
is a rather unofficial technical term used in systematics
and contemporary biology in general. One often sees
it used in taxonomic description papers and scientific
papers on topics related to species, such as speciation.
”Good species” is typically used to characterize indi-
vidual species, as in “Xus bus is a good species.” Once
a taxon is considered to be a good species, the fact
that it is a species is generally taken for granted. This
is partly because being deemed a good species implies
that it will satisfy conditions specified by many species
criteria and thus be judged to be a species under them:
Xus bus is a reproductively isolated population, consists
of a monophyletic lineage, occupies a single distinctive
niche, and so on at the same time. Thus Xus bus will be
judged to be a species under the biological species con-
cept, the ecological species concept, the monophyletic
species concept, and so on so that it looks as though it
would be a species regardless of one’s theoretical com-
mitments.3
3.1 Meanings of ”Good Species”
Here I describe a couple of usages of ”good species”
among biologists. Among the several usages of ”good
species,” our focus is on a case in which it is used to
refer to (1) a species which is distinctive or well-defined
by multiple species criteria, or (2) a taxon that an au-
thor assumes is generally classified as a species by the
biological community.
An Alleged Species by Multiple Criteria A taxonomist
sometimes implies that multiple alternative species cri-
teria are satisfied by a good species. The papers in
which this usage occurs tend to make the fact that their
judgment is based on multiple criteria explicit. One ex-
ample of this is as follows (Hamada and Adler, 1999, p.
273):
Polytene chromosomes of four members of the
Simulium perflavum species group in Brazil are
described,. . . Chromosomal, morphological and eco-
logical evidence indicates that S. maroniense Floch
3 Note that ”good species” is an unofficial term and thus
its usages may greatly vary from one biologist to another.
Thus I do not claim that this is the only usage of the term.
What I will do below is to suggest that biologists do use
”good species” in a certain way, but this doesn’t preclude
the possibility that biologists use the term in other ways. See
Footnote 6 for such a usage.
& Abonnenc, previously considered synonymous
with S. rorotaense, is a good species.
In this case the authors cite three alternative species
criteria (genetics, morphology, and ecology) when they
call the taxon a “good species.”
This might look like definitional reasoning, but none
of the extant, competing definitions of ‘species’ is in-
voked as the correct definition. Nor is there any claim
that the range of criteria satisfied constitute necessary
and sufficient conditions for specieshood. It is rather the
case that the more criteria satisfied, the more confident
biologists are in their taxonomic judgment.
Some species theorists seem to follow this usage of
”good species,” too. Alan Templeton (1989) proposes
his own definition of species, the cohesion species con-
cept. The rough idea is that a species is a population
which is reproductively isolated from others and/or oc-
cupies a distinct fundamental niche (and thus is sub-
ject to the common selection pressure). He argues that
extending the biological species concept this way we
can include asexual organisms and thereby have a more
comprehensive picture of evolutionary processes behind
species and speciation. What is important in our dis-
cussion is that Templeton regards it as an advantage of
the concept that it helps us make sense of why a good
species is good. For Templeton, good species “are gen-
erally regarded as geographically cohesive taxa that can
coexist for long periods of time without any breakdown
in genetic integrity” (1989, p. 23). Then he argues that
in order to live together for a sufficiently long time in
a single habitat, those taxa need to be reproductively
isolated and occupy different niches.
The fact that there is no breakdown in genetic
integrity in spite of sympatry implies the lack
of genetic exchangeability [i.e., reproductive iso-
lation] between taxa. However, the condition of
prolonged coexistence also implies that they have
distinct ecological niches. Hence, “good species”
are those that are well defined both by genetic
and demographic exchangeability. (1989, p. 23;
italics added)
Templeton then goes on to compare good species
with “bad” species, those which satisfy either reproduc-
tive or ecological criteria, but not both. “By providing a
precise definition of ‘bad species’ (the conflict between
genetic and demographic exchangeability), the cohesion
concept is a tool for gaining insight into the process of
speciation” (1989, p. 23). One can see that in his con-
ception of ”good species” the more criteria satisfied,
the better a taxon counts as a species, as far as those
reproductive and ecological criteria are concerned.
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Notice that Hamada and Adler and Templeton could
mean slightly different things by ”good species.” This
is because biologists may mean two different things
by ”good species.” Firstly, they may use the phrase
only to express epistemic confidence in their taxonomic
judgment: when they call Xus bus a good species, they
could mean that there are good grounds for their tax-
onomic judgment that it is a species (as opposed to
a subspecies, a variety, and so on). This is only con-
cerned with their epistemic state, not what is the case
about a particular taxon. However, taxonomists could
also mean that good and bad species are different on
ontological grounds: they are different kinds of species.
In the two quotes discussed, Hamada and Adler do not
mention (at least explicitly) ontological differences be-
tween good and bad species, while Templeton does.4
That biologists including Templeton regard it as a
characteristic of good species that they satisfy multiple
species criteria is interesting in light of work in cogni-
tive psychology. Cognitive psychologists point out that
humans are particularly keen to make multiple inter-
relational associations among objects. In other words,
humans tend more quickly to learn how to tell one
category from another when two categories are differ-
ent in multiple properties, rather than a single prop-
erty (Rosch and Mervis, 1975; Murphy, 2002; Holland
et al, 1989). If one species is different from another in
multiple criteria, then their phenotypic difference is so
striking that one could easily classify them as different
species.
Good Species as a Taxon Generally Judged to Be a
Species by the Biological Community Another, related
usage is the one in which it is used to refer to a taxon
that an author assumes is generally classified as a species
by the biological community. One difference from the
above usage is that when a biologist uses ”good species”
this way, she does not mention any particular crite-
rion of species classification, but simply takes it for
granted that the biological community would agree that
a taxon at hand is a species. While the biologist might
believe that this classificatory judgment is based on
some criteria, she rather emphasizes collective agree-
ment. To put it another way, this usage is based on
the second-order judgment, one’s judgment about other
taxonomists’ judgment.
While taxonomists would and should rely on their
own judgment, not what other taxonomists have said,
when they describe a new species, they do make refer-
ence to collective judgment in some contexts. For in-
stance, under this usage, biologists often use a good
4 I thank an anonymous referee for bringing my attention
to this point.
species as a a source of further induction. That is, the
authors assume that “good species” are species and try
to discover novel characters of them in order to in-
fer something significant about the nature of species
in general. Kai Chan and Simon Levin seem to use
”good species” in this way. In so doing, they attribute
some properties (exchanging genetic material with each
other) to species in general.
It is commonly assumed that “good” species are
sufficiently isolated genetically that gene genealo-
gies represent accurate phylogenies. However, it
is increasingly clear that good species may con-
tinue to exchange genetic material through hy-
bridization (introgression)... (Chan and Levin,
2005, p. 720)
In cases like this, the authors do not always cite
any paper to support that the relevant “good species”
are, indeed, actually recognized as species; it is implied
that they are so recognized by the taxonomic and bio-
logical community, and fellow biologists would not find
it difficult to see that implication.
The above authors do not explicitly discuss species
definitions. But James Mallet (1995a,b, 1996) uses ”good
species” in a similar way, while discussing species con-
cepts.
I used the term ‘good’ species several times mean-
ing that people generally agree that ‘the blue
whale’ and ‘the fin whale,’ for example, are species,
... Unless taxonomists are mad, there is some-
thing reasonable about such species ... (Mallet,
1996, p. 174)
He does not refer to any particular criterion when
he says that the blue whale and the fin whale are rec-
ognized as a species. Mallet uses this phrase indepen-
dently of any particular criterion, because he intends to
offer his definition of species (genotypic cluster species
concept) by examining what features good species pos-
sess. Note that Chan & Levin do not go that far; they do
not rule out the possibility that biologists adopt differ-
ent definitions of species when they classify some taxon
as a good species.5
5 I am inclined to offer an interesting instance of this us-
age of ”good species.” Arthur Cronquist (1978), a plant tax-
onomist, quotes, as “an old joke” among taxonomists, “a good
species is what a good taxonomist says it is” and compares
this with a statement on pornography made by Potter Stew-
art, a judge of the Supreme Court of the Unites States, that
”hard-core pornography” was hard to define, but “I know
it when I see it.” The same comparison is made by Pigliucci
and Kaplan (2006) (without mentioning Cronquist), although
they simply use the term ”species,” not ”good species.” Here
Cronquist and Stewart both appeal to collective coincidence
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It is also worth noting that there is a normative
element to the notion of good species. Characterizing
a taxon by calling it a ”good species” often involves a
(perhaps reasonable) expectation that other taxonomists
will or should recognize the taxon as a species. Mal-
let emphasizes how normativity arises from collective
agreement within the taxonomic community. When he
says, “Unless taxonomists are mad, there is something
reasonable about such species,” Mallet implies that there
is a normative element to the collective judgments of
taxonomists.
Summary We have seen two important usages of ”good
species” among biologists. Among other things, the phrase
”good species” refers to:
1. an alleged species that satisfies more than one species
criterion, and
2. a taxon generally recognized as a species by the bi-
ological community.
Although the two meanings are different, they over-
lap significantly, in that if a taxon is a good species in
the first sense, it is likely to be a good species in the
second sense, and vice versa. The more species crite-
ria ——such as reproductive isolation and phylogenetic
properties—— a taxon satisfies, the stronger the expec-
tation that other taxonomists would also classify it as
a legitimate species will be, whether the expectation is
based on ontological grounds or not. The reverse rela-
tion also holds: if Xus bus is generally judged to be a
species by the taxonomic community, then Xus bus is
judged to be a species according to many criteria. 6
3.2 Good Species is a Prototype of Species
Now I propose to analyze this notion of good species,
drawing on some tools from cognitive psychology. My
thesis is that the notion of good species is a prototype
of judgments on membership of the categories——if Judge
Stewart had not believed that other people would agree with
his judgment, one might ask why he made such an argument
because the appeal to his intuitive judgment would not be
persuasive at all.
6 It is important to remember that I do not intend to say
that this is the only way in which biologists use the phrase,
and that some of the other usages in fact do not fit with the
one discussed here. For example, biologists often do use ”good
species” to refer to a taxon if it satisfies a single species crite-
rion rather technically (see Dumont (2004) for one instance).
It should come as no surprise given that ”good species” has
no official definition. The point is, however, that biologists
often do use the phrase in the way I have suggested, and this
usage can be subject to analysis in terms of psychological
theories of concepts, as I will do in the next section.
of species, as explicated in cognitive psychology, and bi-
ologists often represent species with its prototype, good
species, when they think of species non-definitionally.
I will briefly review some of the prototype effects and
demonstrate that the notion of good species shares those
features. Due to the form of my argument, each point
of similarity, if taken alone, may not be strong enough
to make a convincing case for my thesis; however, those
points, if brought together, strongly suggest that good
species is a prototype of ”species.”
‘Good X’ The term ‘good species’ has the same linguis-
tic features as other prototype terms. Quite literally,
the phrase ”good X” is often used by psychologists
to refer to prototypical instances of a concept. When
psychologists attempt to find prototypes of a concept
operationally, they almost always ask subjects to pick
“good” instances of a concept.
For example, (Armstrong et al, 1983, p. 277) use
”good X” to refer to a prototypical member of a cate-
gory in the instructions of their experiment:
On this form you are asked to judge how good
an example of a category various instances of the
category are ...
There are many other examples like this. In an ex-
periment by Smith et al (1988), subjects are asked to
rate each item “for how good an example it is of the
category” (p. 502). Psychologists themselves also com-
monly refer to a prototype by ‘good X.’ For example,
“subjects overwhelmingly agree in their judg-
ments of how good an example or clear a case
members are of a category . . . ” (Rosch, 1978, p.
36, see also p. 37)
“. . . The top half of the table contains the data
for instances that were ‘good’ members of their
corresponding conjunctions . . . ” (Smith et al,
1988, p. 504).
Notice that Smith et al add quotation marks to
“good members.” The use of quotation marks even co-
incides with taxonomists’ use of them. Many biologists
add quotation marks to “good” or “good species,” as
Mallet and Chan and Levin do. The use of scare quotes
generally indicates that the speaker distances himself
from the literal meaning of a word or phrase enclosed
within them. Thus when biologists use scare quotes to
”good species,” they try to distance themselves from
the literal meaning of the phrase. Still, it is not easy
to say what exactly biologists distance themselves from
and why when sufficient contextual information is not
available. This is because what scare quotes contribute
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to the informational content of an entire utterance de-
pends on the context in which it is made (see Predelli,
2003).
Nevertheless we can put forward a more or less plau-
sible account of the coincidence. First I want to look
at parallelism with another usage of scare quotes with
regards to prototypes. Psychologists do not use scare
quotes only for ”good X”; they also use them for ad-
jectives derived from a category name such as ”doggy.”
For example, Armstrong et al (1983, p. 275) use such
an adjective in the instruction to subjects (they took
this part of the instruction verbatim from Rosch 1975):
This study has to do with what we have in mind
when we use words which refer to categories . . . .
Think of dogs. You all have some notion of what
a ‘real dog’, a ‘doggy dog’ is. To me a retriever
or a German Shepherd is a very doggy dog while
a Pekinese is a less doggy dog. . . . On this form
you are asked to judge how good an example of
a category various instances of the category are
. . .
Using scare quotes, psychologists distance themselves
from the literal meaning of ”a doggy dog” because it
sounds self-contradictory; after all, dogs are dogs, and
they are all doggy by definition. By the same token,
they also distance themselves from the literal meaning
of ”real dog” or ”good dog,” because no dog is, by defi-
nition, more or less real (or good) as a dog than others.
It appears that behind intuitions like those is the clas-
sical view of concepts. In other words, what the scare
quotes imply is that psychologists are more or less plu-
ralistic on concepts when they use scare quotes ——the
classical view and the prototype view—— and this is
why they use scare quotes for ”a doggy dog” and ”good
X.”
I suspect that this same is true of biologists us-
ing scare quotes to ”good species.” As the quote from
Darwin at the outset of the paper suggests, biologists
may be pluralistic on the notion of species. They often
have in mind prototypes when they talk about species
(the prototype view). Meanwhile, biologists do repre-
sent the notion of species via definitions (the classical
view). Thus it is no wonder that they distance them-
selves from the literal meaning of ”good species” while
using prototype reasoning. If this account is on the right
track, then the use of scare quotes by psychologists and
biologists may not be just a coincidence; they use scare
quotes for the same reason.
Hedges More linguistic evidence comes from hedges. Al-
though “A robin [a prototypical bird] is a bird” and “A
penguin is a bird” are both true, adding some hedges
(qualifying terms such as ”virtually,” and ”technically”)
could change their truth values: “A penguin is techni-
cally a bird” is judged to be true while “A robin is tech-
nically a bird” is not (Lakoff, 1973; Rosch, 1978). To
put it differently, a prototype will never be a borderline
case. The same thing seems true of ”good species.” Re-
call that Templeton distinguishes good and bad species.
Ernst Mayr joins him when he distinguishes good species
and borderline cases (incipient species) in his 1942 book
(Mayr, 1942, p. 155):
Geographic speciation is thinkable only, if sub-
species are incipient species. This, of course, does
not mean that every subspecies will eventually
develop into a good species. Far from it! All this
statement implies is that every species that de-
veloped through geographic speciation had to
pass through the subspecies stage. There is, nat-
urally, a considerable infant mortality among sub-
species and only a limited number reaches adult-
hood, or the full species stage.7
Thus, for Templeton and Mayr, a good species is
not a borderline case of species (see also Coyne and
Orr (2004) for another instance). Consequently, those
hedges would change the truth value of propositions
containing ”good species.” Sentences such as “Xus bus
is a good species and technically a species” sound false
in the usage discussed here. In contrast, “Xus bus is not
a good species, but technically a species” sounds true,
just as “A penguin is technically a bird” sounds true. I
concede that there is a usage of ”good species” in which
hedges do not change the truth value of propositions
containing the phrase. Nonetheless there is also a usage
of the phrase in which hedges do change the truth value
of some propositions containing ‘good species.’
Agreement on Specieshood Related but nonlinguistic sup-
port for our claim is agreement among biologists on
specieshood. Rosch (1978) points out that subjects make
similar judgments on how well a given object belongs
to a category. This implies that a prototype of a cat-
egory is generally considered to be a member of that
category. This is what is observed about good species.
We have seen that once a biologist judges some taxon
to be a good species she will form a strong expectation
that other competent biologists will concur. Biologists
often use ”good species” to refer to species taxa that
almost all biologists would judge to be a species, as
Mallet does.
7 One might object that Mayr may in fact see incipient
species as non-species and thus think that there are no bor-
derline cases. But this is not the case. See Mayr 1942, p. 114.
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Inference from Good Species Biologists sometimes in-
fer properties of a good species to the whole group of
species, including borderline ”bad” species. For exam-
ple, Chan and Levin (2005) point out that some good
species hybridize with each other and then suggest that
species in general could hybridize (see the quote from
them on p. 4).8 Psychologists found that subjects tend
to infer properties exhibited in a prototypic member of
a category to non-typical members (but not the other
way around): if a robin has a property f , then a penguin
probably has it (but not vice versa; Lakoff, 1989). It is
worth noting that Lakoff’s remark also shows that this
inference would be made for all members of the cat-
egory, not just atypical members, because a category
generally consists of ”good” (prototypic) and ”bad”
(non-prototypical) members. Subjects tend to believe
that if a robin has a property f , then any bird (includ-
ing a ”bad” member of bird like penguin) would have it.
If it is sensible to read Lakoff’s remark this way, people
arguably make similar inferences involving good species.
In other words, biologists would infer the properties a
species has from those a good species has, which is what
we have observed.9
One last point. In the preceding section (§3.1), we
have observed that the notion of good species has epis-
temic and ontological dimensions. Taxonomists may call
a taxon a ”good species” only to express their epistemic
confidence on its specieshood; whereas they could also
imply that there are real or ontological differences be-
tween good and bad species as Templeton does. It is
important to note that psychologists’ conception of pro-
totypes has both of the elements. We have seen that pro-
totype theorists assume that a category has the onto-
logically graded structure (§2). On the other hand, sev-
eral prototype effects mentioned before, such as quick
identification of prototypical members of a category, im-
ply that one has epistemic confidence or clarity about
8 The use of prototypes in taxonomic practice may be more
widespread than this section suggests. Jody Hey (2001, p.
162) points out that when taxonomists engage in species clas-
sification, they often rely on a prototype of that species and
treat each species as if it is a natural kind, rather than an
individual.
9 As I noted in this section, the prototype of species, good
species, is characterized by the consilience of different proper-
ties. This makes our proposal look like one of the cluster views
of species, including the homeostatic property cluster theory
(Boyd, 1999) and David Hull’s cluster definition of species
(Hull, 1965). The difference, however, lies in the fact that our
proposal is not about the species category per se, but about
its prototype. It can be the case that a category has a proto-
typical member while it has sharp boundaries: even number
is a sharply delineated category but does have a prototypical
member, such as 2. Likewise our proposal does not preclude
the possibility that the species category is not characterized
by a cluster of properties.
the category membership of such instances. Franks and
Bransford (1971) also found that subjects are more con-
fident in identifying prototypical items than atypical
items. This is also reflected in the fact that many psy-
chologists describe prototypical members as a “clear”
example of a category. Eleanor Rosch (1978), for ex-
ample, says, “Another way to achieve separateness and
clarity of actually continuous categories is by conceiving
of each category in terms of its clear cases rather than
its boundaries” (pp. 35-36.). Psychologists’ stress on
diagnostic clarity of prototypical members implies that
subjects have epistemic clarity or confidence in their
judgment when they classify a prototypical member of
a category.
3.3 How Biologists Reason With the Help of Good
Species——Attribute Substitution
Another interesting connection between good species
and prototype reasoning has to do with the phenomenon
of “attribute substitution” (Kahneman and Frederick,
2002). When attribute substitution occurs, a subject
represents one attribute of an object with another some-
what relevant, not identical, attribute. Kahneman and
Frederick call the first kind of attribute the “target at-
tribute” and the second the “heuristic attribute.” In
their words, ”attribute substitution” means that “an
individual assesses a specified target attribute of a judg-
ment object by substituting another property of that
object ——the heuristic attribute—— which comes more
readily to mind” (p. 53, italics in original). Kahneman
and Frederick suggest that this is often done by sub-
stituting questions; subjects often replace a question
about a target attribute (a target question) with a ques-
tion about a heuristic attribute (a heuristic question). If
attribute substitution (along with substitution of ques-
tions) is one of the things subjects do in the case of
prototype reasoning, and the good species category is a
prototype of the notion of species, then it is no wonder
that biologists do the same thing with good species. This
is to say that biologists represent the notion of species
by its prototype, good species, in their minds and make
an inference about the attributes a species could have
(target attributes) from the attributes a good species
has (heuristic attributes).
Attribute Substitution of Species by Good Species: Bi-
ologists often implicitly represent the concept of species
by its prototype, good species, and infer what attributes
a species has (target attributes) from the attributes a
good species has (heuristic attributes). Thus, biologists
often implicitly answer a question about a species (a
target question) by answering a question about a good
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species (a heuristic question).
This is because attributes of a good species are often
more readily available in the biologist’s mind and this
leads him to access those attributes when he reasons
about the species category.
Of course, what we have done here is just to follow
Kahneman and Frederick and postulate the existence
of the substitution of species with good species. In the
next section I will make a case for it by pointing out
that attribute substitution can make sense of a couple of
puzzling phenomena regarding biologists’ dealings with
species and the species problem.10
4 Non-definitional Understanding of Species
In this section we will see how good species as a proto-
type of species and attribute substitution could explain
some puzzling phenomena regarding biologists’ dealings
with species in a non-definitional mode.
One feature of the non-definitional mode of under-
standing species is what might be called elusive trans-
parency. Several researchers have observed that biolo-
gists believe they understand the nature of species when
they think about it in an unarticulated way, but subse-
quently find themselves at a loss when asked to define it:
in everyday research biologists behave as if the species
problem is already solved, while fully aware that it isn’t.
Although this kind of phenomenon might be seen in
other areas, philosophers have not paid due attention
to it in the controversy over the concept of species.
4.1 Hey’s Observation
This phenomenon has been observed by biologists them-
selves on several occasions. Geneticist Jody Hey pro-
10 In this section I applied the prototype theory of concept
to analyse biologists’ attitudes toward the concept of species.
One might suspect that this was only possible if I downplay
or ignore the fact that there are several objections to the
prototype theory in cognitive psychology (see, for example
Laurence and Margolis, 1999, for the objections). Yet this
does not mean that the use of the prototype theory in the
present paper is not warranted. For our purposes, it is not
necessary to assume that the prototype theory is the appro-
priate account of concept. Our proposal is compatible with
pluralism about the concept of concept. It is because our aim
is to point to some unattended aspects in biologists’ use of
the concept ‘species’ and to explore their philosophical im-
plications. In this context, we need an assumption that the
prototype theory accounts for the phenomena in question,
but not an assumption that it accounts for all the phenom-
ena about concept. And pluralism about concept is a sensible
position. We cannot go into the details of the debate, but
several authors are sympathetic to the pluralistic account of
concept (see for example Machery, 2008).
vides one example. Hey (2001) reports that biologists,
including himself, often find themselves casually using
the word ”species” in conversation with colleagues, as
if they fully understand its common meaning. And this
despite the fact that they know, as intimately as any-
one, all the difficulties that have attended every at-
tempt to define the notion. In his own words, Hey con-
fesses,
It has been my experience ——and I am guess-
ing that it is a typical one—— that when talking
with biologists, one hears [the term ”species”]
tossed about regularly in a manner that sup-
poses there is one single common meaning. If
pressed on that common meaning, biologists are
stuck, but they persist in using the word in a
casual way much as laypersons do, as if it has a
well-known meaning. (Hey, 2001, p.11)
This strikes much the same chord as Darwin’s pas-
sage, written nearly 150 years earlier (§1). Biologists
still claim to know what ”species” means, and take
this understanding for granted in casual conversation.
And, equally, biologists still find it hard to articulate
their understanding to others, much less to give the
single correct definition of the term. This is a rather
puzzling phenomenon; one may wonder why biologists
believe that ”species” has one common meaning when
they should be aware of the fact that there have been
different attempts to define ”species” in the history of
biology and none commands universal support.11
Note that elusive transparency should not be taken
to imply that everything biologists believe they un-
derstand about species is illusory. Biologists ——from
those mentioned in Darwin’s quote to those working at
present—— are not ignorant of the nature of species,
not completely, anyway. Thus, biologists do know some-
thing about species. It simply doesn’t take the form of
a definition.
4.2 Luckow’s Observation
A similar observation can be made specifically of tax-
onomists. Rarely do they specify which species concept
they are using in papers describing new species. But of
course, they, of anyone, can appreciate the variety of
species concepts.
This is Melissa Luckow’s observation. Luckow (1995)
surveyed 130 papers on species in two professional jour-
nals for systematists, Systematic Botany and System-
11 Cronquist (1978) and Pigliucci and Kaplan (2006) also
point to this apparent transparency of the notion of species
to biologists.
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atic Zoology (now called Systematic Biology) from 1989-
1993. In doing so, she observed that the authors of many
papers do not specify what species concept they are us-
ing, despite an apparent expectation that they do so.
Luckow says,
... most of the papers were not explicit about
which species concept was being used. (p. 598)
Only 20% of the papers in Systematic Botany
were explicit as to the criteria being used; the
default criterion was usually gaps in qualitative
variation. An even smaller subset (8%) of papers
specified which species concept was being used.
(p. 600)
Based on her study, Luckow recommends that sys-
tematists explicitly declare their choice of criteria for
species classification. But it is puzzling why Luckow
has to make such a recommendation in the first place;
since taxonomists should be aware that there are differ-
ent definitions of ”species,” they may well clarify what
they mean by ”species” by declaring their choice of defi-
nition. This observation conforms with Hey’s anecdotal
report that biologists tend to take their notion of species
for granted and not feel the need to make it explicit in
practice——at least not unless they are asked to do so.
One might wonder if it is because of lack of space,
not lack of interest or attention, that taxonomists do
not articulate their choice of species concept. This may
be true of some papers, but certainly not most. Declar-
ing one’s choice would not take much space at all, if one
does not discuss what is the right concept of species. A
few sentences or a couple of paragraphs would suffice,
and many papers describing new species are three to
five pages long. Thus, adding a few sentences to indi-
cate their preferred definition would not much reduce
——if at all—— the possibility of acceptance. There-
fore, I do not believe that taxonomists fail to articulate
their choice because they fear this will cost them accep-
tance of their paper.
4.3 The Idea of “Good Species” Makes Sense of the
Non-definitional Mode of Understanding Species
Our explication of ”good species” helps us to better
understand this non-definitional mode of understand-
ing species. First, substitution of the concept of species
by its prototype makes sense of Jody Hey’s observa-
tion: that when he and other biologists participate in
casual conversation, they employ the term ”species” as
if it had one common meaning, although they are fully
aware of the fact that there is no universally accepted
definition of ”species.” This makes sense if they repre-
sent the concept of species by a prototype and answer
a target question (e.g., “Is species a homogeneous cate-
gory such that biologists can easily grasp the nature of
it?”) by answering a heuristic question (e.g., “Is good
species a homogeneous category such that biologists can
grasp the nature of it?”). This is because a good species
usually looks quite homogeneous and distinct in that it
tends to satisfy many species criteria and one can eas-
ily tell that it is a species. We have seen that humans
tend more quickly to learn how to tell one category
from another when two categories are different in mul-
tiple properties, rather than a single property (see p. 3).
Even though there is no clear and common meaning in
the term ”species” (a target attribute), the prototype
makes it look as if there is such a meaning (a heuristic
attribute), and speakers easily believe that they grasp
it. This also explains why they find it hard to precisely
define species; when species is represented by the proto-
type, their understanding of the notion is not mediated
by words and a prototype may not easily translate into
a strict definition——the category has the gradient of
membership.
Another fact Kahneman and Frederick notice about
attribute substitution supports our idea that biologists
often represent the notion of species by its prototype.
They note that one condition for the occurrence of at-
tribute substitution is that substitution is not inter-
vened by a reflective psychological process (Kahneman
and Frederick, 2002, p. 54). Thus, one has good reason
to suspect that biologists make the same kind of sub-
stitution when engaged in casual conversation (recall
Hey’s observation quoted on p. 8), because they are
probably not attending to details about species. This
also suggests that good species is a component of the
implicit mode of understanding species.
Attribute substitution also makes sense of obser-
vations made by Luckow. She notes that taxonomists
are not interested in explicitly declaring their preferred
species concept in their description papers. If the substi-
tution occurs unreflectively, then naturally they would
feel little need to spell out their conception of species
and get involved in the controversy, because substitu-
tion may automatically lead them to believe, by the
help of the prototype, that they understand the nature
of species. A category mediated by its prototype looks
transparent to a subject (a heuristic attribute), even
though the nature and the right definition of species
has been the subject of a considerable controversy (a
target attribute). One can also describe this in terms of
species criteria. A good species is a species according to
many criteria. If a taxonomist recognizes a given taxon
as a good species, she may feel little need to specify
species criterion she would apply, because that taxon
will be judged to be a species anyway.
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If the substitution occurs, we can make sense of the
observations made by Luckow. And there is a piece of
evidence that it does occur. Taxonomic practice helps
the substitution occur in the minds of taxonomists when
they describe a new species as a species. There is a
recommendation in the taxonomic community that a
(new) species should be described clearly, so that it
can be easily distinguished from other species (Win-
ston, 1999). Described this way, individual species are
likely to be represented as a good species in the minds
of taxonomists, because distinctness is a feature of a
good species (see section 3.1). Substitution also nicely
meshes with Hey’s remark that taxonomists use pro-
totypes in describing individual species (see Footnote
8 for the quote from him). If taxonomists make use of
prototypes in their minds when they classify organisms
into individual species, then they may well use them at
the category level. Notice I do not mean that attribute
substitution is always the cause of the phenomena ob-
served by Luckow; a biologist may not make explicit his
choice of species definition because of a deliberate de-
cision. Yet the attribute substitution is still a possible,
but often neglected explanation of many such cases.
There is one further thing to note. I suspect that
taxonomists often commit attribute substitution when,
for instance, they describe a new species as a species.
This is true of many taxonomists, but not all biolo-
gists, especially species theorists engaged in the species
controversy (certainly, a biologist such as Ernst Mayr
would be sensitive to species definitions in any sort of
research). Recall that Luckow’s observation is about
taxonomists in general, not participants in the species
controversy. But where average taxonomists are con-
cerned, they undertake their research relatively unboth-
ered by the species problem.
5 “Good Species” and the Species Problem
The conclusion of the last section is that biologists fre-
quently represent the concept of species by good species.
In this section, I discuss two implications of this finding.
Good Species and the Persistence of the Species Prob-
lem I will discuss how this nondefinitional mode of un-
derstanding species helps explain why the species prob-
lem persists.
Let me elaborate the question. Given that species is
seen as an important concept in evolutionary biology
and that biologists have reached no consensus regard-
ing its nature and the right definition of it, one might
suspect this lack of consensus presents serious obsta-
cles to biologists. However, this does not seem to be
the case. The study of speciation has made significant
progress for decades (Coyne and Orr, 2004). Taxonomy
as a whole does not seem to slow down because of the
species problem. Indeed, as the observations by Hey and
Luckow suggest, biologists behave as if they are not as
much bothered by the current state of the species prob-
lem as one might expect, even though they should be
aware of the problem. This contributes to the persis-
tence of the species problem in the following sense: had
biologists abandoned the concept of species altogether
because of the bleak prospect of resolving the species
problem, then the species problem would have ceased
to exist. Since they do not stop using the concept of
species, however, naturalists and philosophers are still
motivated to decide what the nature and the right def-
inition of species is.12
Attribute substitution provides biologists with a way
to employ the notion of species but bracket the prob-
lems surrounding it. A good species, as a prototypical
species, is expected to be judged as a species by most
competent biologists or many species criteria. Thus,
as long as they work on good species, those biologists
would not face serious conceptual or practical difficul-
ties surrounding the notion of species. For example, if
a taxon Xus bus is a good species, taxonomists do not
have to make explicit which concept they adopt when
talking about the taxon, because it would be a species
whichever definition is taken. This means that in many
cases, biologists could take for granted that a taxon
they are working on is a species under most definitions
and thus would not be bothered by the species problem.
It also means that disputes over competing species
definitions may not be as relevant to biologists’ actual
dealings with species as many species theorists believe.
We cannot estimate what proportion of the entire col-
lection of species are good species, but it may well be
more than a small fraction of it. Then it follows that
in many research contexts selecting one definition of
species over another does not matter much to biolo-
gists’ practice. While adopting one species definition
over another would still affect how we draw boundaries
between species in principle, it does not make a signif-
icant difference to the way in which biologists classify
and study individual species in practice.
12 It should be noted that one might take the persistence
question more narrowly. According to the present descrip-
tion, the resolution of the species problem is not restricted to
agreeing on the nature of species. If, for example, the biologi-
cal community comes to agree that the species category is not
a natural kind and abandons the project of giving a definition
of it altogether, this would also be taken as a “resolution” of
the problem in this description, because the species problem
would no longer appear as a “problem” to biologists. In other
words, in our interpretation, one aspect of the persistence of
the species problem is that biologists feel pressed to solve the
problem in one way or another.
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There Is More to The Species Problem Than Definitions
Let me turn to the second implication. Our analysis so
far is mainly concerned with how biologists represent
the concept of species. Biologists tend to understand
the concept of species through its prototype and when
they do, they often do not have particular definitions
in mind. One might think that our enterprise is thus
not directly concerned with the central questions of the
species problem ——what is the nature of species and
what is the right definition of species—— and therefore
that our analysis is not relevant to the species problem.
But this is not entirely true; although the questions of
how species is represented and what its nature is are not
identical, they might not be independently answered.
An answer to the latter question could restrict the range
of possible answers to the former question.
Indeed, some extant attempts to answer the core
questions of the species problem make an assumption
about the way in which biologists represent species.
Since the abundance of species definitions is a salient
phenomenon in the history of the modern species de-
bate, philosophers and biologists have paid excessive
attention to individual definitions and their mutual in-
compatibility: the same taxon is a species according to
one definition, but not a species according to another.
Among those attempts, Marc Ereshefsky (1992) argues
that the conflict among different definitions of species is
so grave that we should only use individual definitions
according to contexts ——if we are interested in the
phylogenetic relationship, we should use some version of
the phylogenetic species concept (PSC), for example—
— and abandon the general concept of species (species
eliminativism). There is a species according to BSC or
PSC, but not a species per se.13 Thomas Reydon (2005)
goes so far as to conclude from the abundance and in-
compatibility of different definitions that ”species” does
not constitute even a single coherent concept; the term
”species” is merely a homonym of different definitions.
What Ereshefsky and Reydon share is the assump-
tion that if various definitions of ”species” are inher-
ently incompatible, then there could not or should not
be a single concept of species. This assumption falls
in line with the so-called classical view of concepts: a
concept is represented and, more importantly, individ-
uated by necessary and sufficient conditions for its ap-
plication. Since different species definitions have differ-
ent application conditions, they are different concepts
and there is no common concept of species. What these
13 Recently Ereshefsky (2010) changed his position and now
admits that the term ”species” is so entrenched in biologists’
practice that it is not practical to eliminate it. But he gives
little analysis to the psychological and epistemological roles
species plays in biologists’ minds.
attempts overlook, however, is that biologists do not
always mentally represent a particular definition when
they talk about species. Instead, they are more likely
to represent the concept of species with its prototype,
i.e., good species (see a point Machery (2012) makes on
the concept of life). If this is true, then it follows, for
example, that it is too quick to conclude that ”species”
is a homonym just because different definitions are in-
compatible, because good species is a prototype of the
general concept of species, not any particular definition
of ”species.” Ereshefsky’s eliminativism is also dubious,
because it does not appreciate epistemological roles —
—such as a source of further induction—— which the
concept of good species plays in biologists’ thinking (see
also Ingo Brigandt (2003) and John Wilkins (2009b) for
further discussions of the need to recognize a broader
conception of species concepts).
6 Conclusions
The species problem revolves around competing defini-
tions of species. However, in this paper, I have suggested
that there is more to the species problem than com-
peting definitions. Specifically, I have suggested that
biologists understand the notion of species in a non-
definitional mode as well. Furthermore, I suggested that
in the non-definitional mode, biologists understand species
through the notion of “good species.” The category
good species is a prototype of species, as explicated in
cognitive psychology. As in other cases of prototype rea-
soning, biologists engage in attribute substitution ——
they infer what attributes a species has from the at-
tributes a good species has. Thus, biologists often im-
plicitly answer a question about a species by answer-
ing a question about a good species. And this makes
sense of several puzzling phenomena regarding biolo-
gists’ dealings with species. When biologists work on a
good species, they do not get bothered by issues regard-
ing definitions of species, because a good species meets
various criteria of species at the same time and it is
a species whichever definition one prefers. Finally, we
have seen how the prototypical mode of understand-
ing species illuminates problems with several current
attempts to describe and solve the species problem.
A note is in order. It might be noticed that this
study is not based on psychological experiments where
biologists’ actual reasoning about the material they are
actually working on in their research is examined. It is
partly because there is no experiment, as far as I know,
on whether or how biologists hold the prototypical at-
titude toward the species category. This limitation is
shared by many of the current studies on the cognitive
basis of scientific reasoning (see, for example, Klahr,
12 Yuichi Amitani
2000; Nersessian, 2008).14 Even with this limitation, I
believe that discussion in the present paper will shed
a light on an unattended aspect of biologists’ dealing
with the concept of species and of the species problem.
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